Within the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allows for non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of commercial and non-commercial media outlets, this paper studies the quality and accuracy of media content under different ownership structures and market environments. A main result shows that too few commercial media outlets, or better, too few separate owners of commercial outlets can lead to substantial bias. Adding more owners but also adding noncommercial media outlets brings down the bias; to a lesser extent, so does adding outlets given a fixed number of owners. The paper provides fresh arguments against media consolidation.
Introduction --incomplete
, which is a Hotelling type model of spatial competition that allows for arbitrary numbers of media firms to compete against each other in a non-localized fashion. Within this framework, we consider two types of media outlets, namely, (i) commercial outlets, which maximize profits and are financed mainly through advertising, and (ii) non-commercial outlets, which are funded by either viewers' fees or an exogenously given budget.
Our main results show that too few separately owned commercial media firms can lead to substantial bias of their media content. How many firms are "too few" depends on certain demand, cost, and preference parameters that can in principle be estimated empirically. Increasing the number of separately owned media firms and increasing the number of non-commercial outlets helps towards reducing the biases; and increasing the number of commercial outlets in the market, while keeping the number of owners fixed, can also help, but clearly to a lesser extent.
More specifically, the basic model is structured as follows. There are n (≥ 2) commercial media outlets and a mass one of consumers. The media outlets are located at the endpoints (one for each outlet) of a spokes network that has N ≥ n potential locations. Any two endpoints have distance 1 from each other (and each endpoint therefore has distance 1 2 to the center of the network). Commercial media outlets are assumed to maximize profits which are derived from advertising and payments from the audience minus the costs of producing the programming. Later on (in Section 3.4), we consider the important case where commercial media firms can own multiple (κ ≥ 1) outlets, in which case the nκ total outlets are located (as before) at nκ different endpoints of a spokes network with N ≥ κn endpoints; and finally (in Sections 4 and 5) we also allow for the possibility of m (≥ 0) noncommercial media outlets to be in the market, again each one located at a different endpoint of a spokes network with N ≥ n + m endpoints.
The consumers are uniformly distributed along the N spokes of the network. Transportation (or switching) costs are equal for all consumers in the sense that there is a constant cost t > 0 to "travel" a unit distance (or to "switch" to another outlet). As in Chen and Riordan (2007) , consumers have a preference for only two of the N potential outlets. One interpretation of this is that at a given time of the day a consumer has a preference for only two outlets and any other media outlet does not come into question, possibly because there is a non-media outside option that is preferred. When N > n+m then this means that there are some consumers who are interested in consuming exactly two, one or zero of the n + m actual outlets.
Besides the assumptions implicit in the framework, the analysis relies Age 2007; for (A3) the information variable x is essentially defined through this assumption (see also the discussion in Section 2). Consumers might be put off for a variety of reasons that can include direct health concerns or for ethical, political or ideological reasons. To the extent that branded or advertised products are not "ethical," such information will be sensitive.
On the other hand, once more "ethical" substitutes are advertised, it ceases being sensitive, and information that once depressed consumption may well boost consumption of the (newly) advertised goods. Clearly what constitutes sensitive information may vary over time.
Given these assumptions, we derive a critical numbern such that if there are fewer thann firms in the market, then in equilibrium sensitive information can be completely suppressed (x i = 0 for all i) by all firms; on the other hand, a sufficiently large number of outlets will always guarantee zero suppression or maximum accuracy (x i = 1 for all i) (Proposition 1). The result seems to be robust to different ownership structures, like allowing media firms to own multiple outlets (Proposition 5) and to including non-commercial media outlets (Proposition 8). While audience-funded commercial media tend to be more informative, the possibility of drawing revenues from advertisers can cancel this effect (Propositions 3 and 4). Finally, when allowing for free entry, we also point out that the market may not support sufficiently many separate firms in equilibrium if fixed costs are too high. On the other hand, introducing non-commercial outlets can bring down the critical number n of commercial firms needed to avoid commercially driven suppression of sensitive information (Proposition 8). Finally, the framework also allows media outlets to choose a further quality variable (y) that is separate from the accuracy on the sensitive topics just mentioned. Some remarks on our notion of media bias (measured by the variable x) are in order. In a strict sense, the variable x can be thought of as measuring the amount of information provided on "sensitive" topics (defined implicitly through the effect on C(x)), so that x = 0 corresponds to minimum accuracy or full suppression (self-censorship), while at the other end x = 1 corresponds to full information provision or maximum accuracy or absence of suppression (no censorship see also Schiffrin, 2000 , for the specific case of book publishing [suggests topics such as NAFTA, health insurance, welfare system --''such topics were rarely discussed in books'', p. 135]). At the same time, the information variable x can also be thought of as representing "critical" content in the sense of the inverse of "dumbed down," neutralized or "watered down" content (as discussed e.g., in Hamilton, 2004 , McChesney, 2000 or as the inverse of excessive consumerism-oriented content (e.g., Bagdikian, 2004 , Baker, 1994 , McChesney, 2000 . the idea is that also here,"critical" (or less "dumbed down") content (larger x) tends to lead to less consumption of the advertised products, which in turn, through the internalization by the commercial media, is the source of their biased coverage in this respect. the present paper it explicitly models both advertisers and consumers (besides the media outlets), and so to some extent provides microfoundations for some of the assumptions of the current model. The location model aspect of the present paper, on the other hand, allows to get a more tractable and possibly also more realistic picture of the case of multiple media outlets (n ≥ 2) and with different ownership structures. We believe nonetheless that the present paper underestimates the effects of (large) advertisers to influence media content as it does not explicitly model threats from advertisers to withdraw their ads from commercial media. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model that is used throughout the paper. Sections 3 and 4 consider environments with commercial and noncommercial media outlets respectively; Section 5 allows for mixed environments and Section 6 studies the issue of entry. Section 7 briefly discusses issues of welfare and Section 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications. Most proofs and derivations are contained in an appendix.
The basic framework
We work with the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allows for an arbitrary number of media outlets to compete for audience in a non-localized fashion -unlike the Salop (1979) There are N potential brands and n actual ones. Each consumer has a preference for (at most) two potential brands so that if N > n some consumers may have a preference for one or zero actual brands. (In a separate paper, we study a particular case of this, namely, where N = n. In that case the market is "covered" and each consumer has a preference for exactly two brands, namely, the brand corresponding to the spoke the consumer is located on and another brand chosen at random and with uniform probability from all the remaining spokes. Consumers are therefore indifferent or close to indifferent between the two brands, both of which are available on the market. Any two firms compete for such consumers that are approximately indifferent between their products, while at the same time competing with other firms for other consumers. Notice that this simultaneous competition on several fronts is what distinguishes this spokes model with Salop's (1979) model, where a given firm competes essentially with its two neighbors.
There is an exogenous degree of horizontal product differentiation between the media outlets. Shares are determined by the equation
where s ij is the share of viewers on j's spoke that i appropriates from j, that is
where t > 0 is a transportation cost and outlet i's utility is given by 
where, given our assumption on the exogenous values v >> 0, we can define total audience reached by the n actual outlets in a market with N potential outlets as
Aggregate demand for the advertisers' products is given by
where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is what we refer to as the information or "accuracy" variable, and ψ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant representing the marginal effect of information available to the audience on final consumption.
The more information or the more accurate the information that reaches the public, which we represent with a larger value of x, the less the advertised products will be consumed; moreover, x decreases consumption at a decreasing rate. The functional form is chosen mainly for analytic tractability (Germano and Meier, 2008, work with a linear version, and obtain qualitatively comparable results with respect to this).
As discussed in the introduction, while we take Eq. (2) as the defining characteristic of the information variable x, we believe it can represent a variety of different things. For example, it could represent information that a product does direct harm to a consumer (as in the case of tobacco; see also the Monsanto example; but also dangerous toys, cars, fattening foods, drinks; pharmaceutical products with potentially serious side effects); it could be information that a product is made in a possibly non-desirable way (e.g., with genetically modified organisms GMO's) or under non-desirable conditions (e.g., that are in violation of basic standards such as the the Ethical Trading Initiative, ETI). In each case, the information may put off some consumers from buying a product and hence decrease the total amount of the "generic" advertised good demanded. It could also represent "critical" content in the sense of the inverse of "dumbed down" content (as discussed 
Commercial media
We assume commercial media maximize profits, which consist of revenues from advertising and from fees paid by the audience minus the costs of producing the programming. Specifically, a given commercial media outlet i maximizes profits, which are given by,
where, since we assume a mass one of consumers, C is at the same time total and per capita consumption of the advertised products, p i is at the same time the revenue from all consumers as well as the price paid by an individual consumer to access outlet i, and y i is the level of quality of the programming that is accessed equally by all consumers who have access to the outlet; 0 < η < 1, δ > represents the costs of producing quality of programming. This can be viewed as a fixed cost to produce a programming of quality y i ; for simplicity we also assume that providing information x i is costless.
Advertising funded media
We first consider purely advertising funded media where by assumption prices are zero (p i = 0). By inspection of the marginal profits with respect to x i
we see that profits are increasing whenever
and de-
, so that, when the first inequality holds, it is best to set the maximum level of accuracy (x = 1), while it is best to set the minimum level (x = 0) whenever the second inequality holds.
In other words, solving the equality
with respect to n, gives the critical number of media outlets
at which the optimal strategy switches from minimum to maximum accuracy.
It can be shown that for n <n we have x = 0 as the unique equilibrium solution; while for n >n we have x = 1. This leads to the first main result.
Proposition 1 In a market with N potential media outlets and n < N actual purely advertising funded outlets there is a unique equilibrium with minimum
accuracy (x = 0) whenever n ≤n, and with maximum accuracy (x = 1)
whenever n >n, wheren is given in Eq. (3) above.
Too heavily concentrated media markets or too few media outlets (n ≤n) lead to substantial bias (x = 0). Lower transportation costs (t) and a low marginal effect of sensitive information on consumption (ψ) tend to relax the constraint on the number of outlets needed to avoid substantial bias (see Figure 1 ), while a lower preference parameter on sensitive issues (α) (which might in turn be induced by low "awareness" of these issues) tightens the constraint.
Solving for the equilibrium amount of quality to provide, we obtain
so we can state the following.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the optimal quality levels are given by
where A n is defined in Eq. (1). In particular, in both cases, the level of quality (y) is increasing in the number of actual media outlets (n) and in the preference parameter for quality (β), and is decreasing in the transportation costs (t).
Audience funded media
Next consider media outlets funded exclusively by the audience who pay a price p i for accessing media outlet i and assume (for now) η = 0. From the symmetric FOC's we immediately get x = 1 and for the quality and price we get
with A n defined in Eq. (1), which gives
as the equilibrium price and quality. Here the price and the quality both decrease as the number of actual media outlets in the market increases; the price decreases as the transportation cost decreases. More intense competition decreases prices and releases fewer funds to provide quality.
Audience and advertising funded media
Before considering multiple ownership, we briefly consider the general case where outlets can obtain revenues from both advertising and directly from the audience. Solving for equilibria where all media outlets choose simultaneously accuracy on the sensitive topic x i , quality y i , and prices charged p i , we obtain from the FOC's, after imposing symmetry,
From here we see that whenever transportation costs are too large,
, prices are automatically set to zero, in which case the equilibria reduce to the ones studied in Section 3.1.
Proposition 4 If transportation costs are not excessively large, namely, t ≤
, then the media outlets will choose not to charge their audience (p = 0) and so will be exclusively advertising funded. The equilibrium levels of bias and quality will coincide with the ones of Propositions 1 and 2.
We interpret this as saying that unless there are very large transportation costs (as can occur e.g., with a single live event such as a world cup soccer final) or very small contributions from advertising (e.g., η or C 0 very small) media outlets refrain from charging their audiences. We take the zero price case as the more relevant one and do not fully pursue the case of positive prices.
Multiple ownership
We next turn to the important case where media firms can own more than one media outlet. Let n now denote the total number of owners, and suppose each owner owns κ ≥ 1 actual media outlets. The owner's profits are then
and total consumption is
Defining total audience reached as
we can compute firm i's marginal profits with respect to x κ i as
Again, these are either positive or negative depending on whether the number of separately owned firms n is smaller or greater than the critical valuen(κ) given bȳ
While the functionn(κ) is a decreasing function of κ, it is strictly increasing when multiplied by κ, indicating that what matters is not just the number of total media outlets but also the number of separately owned media firms. as well as the maximum number of media outletsκ max that can be owned, analytically,
Depending on the values of the parameters α, ψ and t, the valueκ max can be substantially below the benchmark value of N , which is the maximum number of outlets a media firm can own while avoiding the censorship problem, if what mattered were only the number of outlets; and similarly the number n min substantially above 1. Letn =n(1), then we can state our second main result, namely the multiple ownership version of Proposition 1. From the FOC's, using symmetry, we compute,
which leads to the equilibrium prices and quality levels,
Again, increasing the number of owners (n) or of subsidiary outlets per owner (κ) increases the quality (y) and decreases the price (p) chosen in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In a market with n ≥ 2 media firms, each of which owns
κ ≥ 1 purely advertising funded media outlets, the level of quality is relatively lower and prices are relatively higher than if there were κn separate firms.
As to be expected, due to the increasing monopoly power, if there are n firms with κ > 1 outlets rather than κn separate firms, then the level of quality (y) becomes relatively lower, and, in the cases where prices are positive, they are relatively higher. In the remainder of the paper, to simplify, we treat the case κ = 1.
Non-commercial media
In order to capture the role of media outlets such as non-profit radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, and to some extent also the increasingly important internet with all its websites and weblogs, many of which are in direct competition with other mainstream outlets, we next consider a second type of media outlet, which we refer to as non-commercial. Before studying the case of mixed markets with commercial and non-commercial outlets, we first briefly consider the case with only non-commercial ones.
We assume non-commercial media maximize the utility they provide to The optimization problem of such a non-commercial outlet is therefore
where B i ≥ 0 is the outlet's budget. The solution to this is given by
In this framework, since market shares are determined as
where A m is defined just as in Eq. (1), they can be written as s i = φ 0 +φ 1 u i , for φ 0 , φ 1 > 0 constant as far as i's optimization problem is concerned, and taking the level of utility of the other outlets as given, we see that maximizing u i is equivalent to maximizing its market share s i .
where the optimal price charged is computed from the corresponding FOC,
In particular, assuming a situation where all media outlets are symmetric and non-commercial, we get the following:
. Notice that, when prices are zero, the quality level is independent of the number (and strategies) of the other non-commercial outelts, whereas, if prices are positive, we can write the level of quality as
Proposition 7 In a market with
so that, the more non-commercial media outlets there are (higher m), the lower the quality provided. This is due to the fact that prices and market shares are decreasing with m, for given N .
Mixed media markets
Clearly, most markets have commercial and non-commercial media outlets operating simultaneously. We next consider this case and derive equilibrium coverage and prices when media outlets act symmetrically relative to their type. We also characterize actual equilibrium shares of commercial vs. noncommercial media. For simplicity, we do not allow media firms to own more than one outlet.
There are N potential media outlets of which n ≥ 2 are commercial and m ≥ 0 are non-commercial media outlets, where n + m < N such that there are N − n − m > 0 potential firms that are not present in the market. As before, commercial outlets are indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, non-commercial ones are indexed i = n + 1, . . . , n + m, and the potential ones not present in the market by i = n + m + 1, . . . , N . Let A n+m denote the total share of the commercial and non-commercial outlets' audience, we can write:
Let σ = n i=1 s i be the actual share of consumers that access commercial media outlets from among all consumers, so that A n+m − σ is the share that access non-commercial media outlets.
The assumption that viewers have a preference for only two outlets im-
≤ 1 with the first and last inequalities strict if n, m > 0.
From Section 4, assuming budgets are not too small or there are sufficiently many non-commercial outlets, we have p N C = 0 and can write the optimal strategy of the non-commercial media as
We can write the profit of the commercial media, for i = 1, . . . , n, as
where, since x N C = 1, we have,
(Notice that σ depends on the shares of all firms and cannot be therefore treated as a constant.) Recall, for i = 1, . . . , n,
Solving for x C yields
and further solving for (y C , p C ) yields
, where it can be checked that again both SOC's are satisfied. Therefore, from
Eq. (8) and using the bounds
, and defining
as upper and lower bounds for α, we can distinguish the following three cases: 
CASE 3: x = 1. Here we have
and
This leads to
Finally, substituting this expression for σ into Eq. (8) above and solving for n gives a new expression forn m , the number of (separately owned) commercial media outlets that will guarantee that there will be no censorship given that there are m non-commercial media outlets in the market. Clearly, the more non-commercial media outlets there are, the smallern m has to be. (See 
In particular, accuracy and quality of the commercial media (respectively x C and y C ) tend to increase with higher values of m and n and tend to decrease with lower values of N and t.

Moreover, everything else equal, an increase in base consumption (C 0 ) increases the actual share of commercial media (σ), while an increase in the budgets of non-commercial media (B) decreases it.
An increase in the budget allocated to non-commercial media can partially crowd out commercial media, while an increase in base consumption C 0 of branded products can also partially crowd out non-commercial media.
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Notice also that in Case (1) above (x C = 0, minimum accuracy) the level of quality of the commercial media outlets (y C ) is higher than in Case (3) (x C = 1, maximum accuracy) due to the fact that more quality is needed to offset the lower level of reporting x C . At the same time, an increase in the non-commercial media outlets' budget B tends to (decrease σ and therefore) increase y C in Case (1) and has no effect in Case (3); it can be shown that the level of quality (y C ) also increases with the number of non-commercial media outlets (m).
Overall, our analysis seems to indicate that even with very low budgets, non-commercial media can have beneficial effects for both accuracy of content (x C ) and quality (y C ) of the commercial media. We should stress that the spokes model has an exogenous symmetry in terms of the positioning of the (actual and potential) outlets, which possibly gives too much audience to the non-commercial outlets. In this sense, while there are, for example, clearly very many non-commercial websites that might qualify as a "media outlet" in our sense, only very few seem to have the capacity and visibility to count as an actual "media outlet" in our underlying spokes model. (--> data on rankings and numbers of visits of websites.)
Free entry --incomplete
To allow for free entry into the above markets, consider the setting with N potential firms, n commercial firms (with κ = 1) and no non-commercial firms. We assume a fixed cost K > 0 to operate any given media outlet and solve for the level of fixed costsK that supports fully informative equilibria, that is, n >n firms in equilibrium if K <K.
Recall, that in the case of purely commercial media with n ≥n, we have,
, p = 0 so that, as the lower bound for the fixed costs supporting fully informative equilibria, we get
. If actual fixed costs are substantially above the obtainedK, then fully informative market structures will not be supported. Clearly, the largern the smallerK will be, and the less likely it will be that a fully informative market structure can be supported.
Welfare analysis --incomplete
We compute total utility in the following two cases: CASE 1: [N ; (n, κ)] or n commercial media firms (n < N ) with κ outlets each:
,
ηC 0 e −ψAκnx C . Assuming that n is not close ton(κ) and κn is not close to N, then it seems clear that increasing both κ and n increases welfare; through increases in y C and since neither decrease x C . On the other hand, as mentioned above, one should be cautious about increasing κ in the other cases as it may force the total number of owners below the cutoffn(κ) if the constraint n ≤ N κ is binding.
The optimal ownership structure, assuming a given target number of total outlets of say M (which in the first best case is equal to N ) is the one that has the most number of different firms/owners n with κ outlets each, satisfying κ = N n and the firms are viable (i.e., cover fixed cost). This is true whether the fixed costs apply at the firm level or at the outlet level. 
is the measure of consumers located on a spoke of any non-commercial media outlet that consumes commercial media outlets; 1 (ψ, t, m, n, N ) 
, and
Assuming standard parameter values and m + n is fixed, then the ownership structure (m, n) and distribution of total resources T B that maximizes W mn is the one that has as many commercial outlets as are profitable given fixed costs and all the rest non-commercial outlets, and where the total budget is divided equally across all the non-commercial outlets. In particular (unless a "small" budget may help an extra commercial media outlet to be viable, which we exclude as being "rare"
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) the total budget is best spent (evenly) on the non-commercial media outlets since they convert every amount received into raising their quality y N C .
Clearly, the welfare measures used only concern the welfare of media viewers (defined narrowly through their "media utilities u i ) and so do not take into account the welfare of the media outlets themselves (nor of the advertisers). One way to address this (at least partially) is to compare their profits with an "outside option" amount rather than just with the fixed costs.
Another aspect that is not accounted for by our welfare measure is that the effect on x may generate important externalities such as having latent problems like global warming not being taken seriously by the public due to low coverage (x C small). outlets. At the same time, the media market in the US is fairly concentrated already. 8 Our results show that excessive concentration of ownership can lead to substantial bias, and, moreover, the numbers we obtain as thresholds for the occurrence of substantial bias are potentially alarming. Clearly, more empirical work is needed to validate the picture sketched by the present model; the stylized facts and insights derived from the model can all in principle be tested by the data. The case of the reporting on global warming over the last few decades might be a good place to start.
Policy discussion --incomplete
Appendix --incomplete
Proofs of Propositions 1-3. Compute for i = j: 
Marginal profits under symmetry are:
Proof of Proposition 1. By inspection of the marginal profits with respect to x i , we have that profits are increasing whenever α(n − 1) >
and decreasing whenever α(n − 1) <
. This means that when the first inequality holds, then it is best to set the maximum level of accuracy (x = 1), while it is best to set the minimum level (x = 0) whenever the second inequality holds. In other words, solving for the equality
for n, gives us the number (of media outlets)
It can be shown that for n <n we have x = 0 as the unique solution; while for n >n we have x = 1 as the unique solution. We can state the following.
Proof of Proposition 3. From the symmetric FOC's we immediately get x = 1 and for the quality and price we get
where A n is defined in Eq. (1). Solving for p then for y, leads to
as the equilibrium price and quality. Proposition 4: The FOC's for the general case are
Solving for (x, y, p) yields in particular,
Proof of Proposition 5. Defining total audience reached as
we can write for j = κ i ,
Notice also that
From this we compute the FOC's.
Again, this expression is either positive or negative depending on whether n is smaller or greater thann(κ) given by:
Proof of Proposition 6. As before we have,
= 0, from which we can compute: , where E = as upper and lower bounds for α, we can distinguish the following three cases (since σ is not (yet) determined and depends in an imortant way on n, we do not solve for n here, but rather for α which we approximate by the functions 
